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STEEL TARIFFS: A SHINING EXAMPLE 
OF THE TENSION BETWEEN POLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS IN THE UNITED 
STATES TODAY 
There is a degree of prejudice against bounties, from an ap-
pearance of giving away the public money without an immedi-
ate consideration, and from a supposition that they serve to 
enrich particular classes, at the expense of the community.1   
I. INTRODUCTION 
n March 5, 2002, the Bush administration announced its 
intention to impose tariffs ranging from 8% to 30% on 
numerous categories of foreign-made steel.2  The President im-
posed the tariffs using the power granted him by the “safe-
guards” provision in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.3  All 
told, President Bush levied tariffs on one-third of the steel 
products imported into the U.S. each year.4  Reaction from U.S. 
  
 1. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, reprinted in INDUSTRIAL 
AND COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 247, 292 (Arthur 
Harrison Cole ed., 1928) (1791). 
 2. Press Release, The United States Mission to the European Union, 
White House Explains Steel Import Relief Decision (Mar. 5, 2002), available 
at http:// www.useu.be/Categories/Trade/Steel/Mar0502/FactSheetSteel 
Decision.html [hereinafter USEU Report].  30% tariffs were imposed on im-
ports of plate, hot-rolled sheet, cold-rolled sheet, coated sheet tin mill prod-
ucts, hot-rolled bar and cold-finished bar.  15% tariffs were imposed on rebar, 
certain tubular products, stainless steel bar and stainless steel rod.  13% tar-
iffs were imposed on carbon and alloy fittings and flanges.  Finally, 8% tariffs 
were imposed on stainless steel wire.  Id.  
 3. Id.  See also Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487(1975)).  Section 201 allows the 
President, after a finding by the U.S. International Trade Commission of seri-
ous injury, to “take all appropriate and feasible action within his power which 
. . . will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive adjust-
ment to import competition and provide greater economic and social benefits 
than costs.”  Id.  The President’s use of this power will be discussed in depth 
throughout this note. 
 4. Peter Morici, Ph.D., Professor of International Business, University of 
Maryland, College Park, The Impact of Steel Import Relief on U.S. and World 
Steel Prices 7 (July 2002), at http: //www.steelnet.org/new/20020700_impact_ 
import_relief.pdf. 
O 
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trading partners affected by the tariffs came quickly, and the 
speed of their reaction was matched only by the veracity of their 
criticism.5  The list of countries bearing the brunt of President 
Bush’s new tariffs reads like a “who’s who” of the U.S.’s closest 
allies — companies in Germany, Great Britain, Brazil, Austra-
lia, South Korea and Japan all stand to lose substantial income 
from steel exports to the U.S. as a result of these measures.6  
The tariffs also affected steel products from Russia and China, 
two countries whose political relationships with the U.S. are 
less stable.7  While the President’s steel tariffs were not a com-
plete surprise — there had been rumblings from the U.S. steel 
industry since 1998 about its inability to cope with increased 
imports from abroad8 — U.S. trading partners had hoped the 
election of pro-trade, republican George W. Bush would stave 
off the imposition of any new protectionist measures.9 
  
 5. CNN/World, EU Steeling for U.S. Trade War (Mar. 6, 2002), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/06/steel.wto1110/index.html  
(E.U. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy said, “[t]he U.S. decision to go down 
the route of protectionism is a major setback for the world trading system”); 
BBC News, Trade War Looms over Steel Dispute (Mar. 6, 2002) at http://news 
.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1856760.stm. (Japanese Trade Minister Takeo Hi-
ranuma said that Japan regretted that the U.S.’s decision had been made 
“without listening to the voices of its trade partners”). 
 6. See BBC News, Trade War Looms Over Steel Dispute, supra note 5. 
 7. Id.  See also CNN, Europe Angry at U.S. Steel Tariff (Mar. 5, 2002) ”), 
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/05/steel/index.html (a Russian 
official warned that U.S. tariffs “could have a serious impact on the atmos-
phere of Russian-American relations”); Joe McDonald, U.S. trade representa-
tive, visiting China, defends steel tariffs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 9, 2002 (Bei-
jing has already demanded compensation from the U.S. for damage to its steel 
industry); Meng Yan, WTO Panel on Horizon, CHINA DAILY, June 7, 2002 (Lei 
Da, a senior economist with the Renmin University of China, said U.S. steel 
tariffs may divert large amounts of steel exports into the Chinese market and 
harm domestic prices). 
 8. See U.S. Trade Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee, 
Jan. 27, 1999, 1999 WL 34884 (Statement of J. Peter Kelly, President and 
CEO of LTV Steel Co.) (“Unfortunately, foreign steel industries have been 
more subsidized, more protected and more cartelized than any other indus-
trial sector . . . .  In fact, past foreign overcapacity and the resulting unfair 
trade practices have harmed U.S. companies to the point where today the U.S. 
industry in periods of strong manufacturing activity can no longer satisfy 100 
percent of U.S. demand.”). 
 9. See Frank Mora, Viewpoint, Farm, Steel subsidies undermine Bush’s 
free trade position, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 17, 2002, at B5 (the hopes of 
 
File: PRIEST base macro final.doc Created on: 6/21/2003 11:21 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
2003] STEEL TARIFFS 1027 
As it turned out, President Bush, who promised a commit-
ment to free trade throughout his election campaign,10 agreed to 
support tariffs soon after he was elected.11  Robert Zoellick, the 
newly appointed U.S. Trade Representative, announced that 
Section 201 action was being considered to help ailing steel 
companies on March 8, 2001, only two months after the Presi-
dent was elected.12  President Bush officially began the process 
of implementing tariffs in June 2001, when he instructed the 
International Trade Commission to investigate the effects of 
imports on the American steel industry.13   
In hindsight, it seems as if President Bush intended to give 
the steel industry its desired breathing room all along, despite 
his pre-election allegiance to free trade.14  The question that the 
U.S.’s trading partners must be asking, is why?  President Bush 
was enjoying an 80% approval rating in early March, 2002,15 so 
it would seem as if he did not need to cater to the now-
weakened steel producers lobby.16  Why would the President, 
whose election platform trumpeted free trade as a cure for the 
  
U.S. trade partners in Latin America were not unfounded, as President Bush 
professed unequivocal support for free trade during his election campaign).  
 10. Robert Collier, Free Trade Battles Re-emerge with Bush, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 20, 2001, at A3.  Bush faced numerous tough decisions in the wake of his 
election as to whether or not he would forge ahead with his campaign promise 
to promote free trade.  The appointment of Robert Zoellick as the U.S. Trade 
Representative seemed to imply that Bush would push for free trade.  Id. 
 11. See Martin Crutsinger, U.S. Eyes Help for Steel Industry, AP ONLINE, 
Mar. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 15178239. 
 12. Id. 
 13. USEU Report, supra note 2.  Pursuant to the requirements for Section 
201 import-relief, the President first had to submit the issue to the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission for a ruling on whether or not steel companies 
were being substantially harmed by unfair export practices of foreign produc-
ers.  See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)). 
 14. See Editorial, All Hat, No Cattle, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2002, at 18 (“The 
President, in March 2002 insisted that ‘[t]rade produces liberty and freedom, . 
. . [and] the U.S. is one of the most open markets in the world and we intend 
to keep it that way.’”).  His imposition of tariffs on steel and lumber imports 
directly contradicts the notion that President Bush and his Administration 
intend to protect the freedom of entry into American markets.  Id. 
 15. Bob Zoellick’s Grand Strategy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 2002. 
 16. See A Tricky Business: Steel Companies Feel the Heat, ECONOMIST, 
June 30, 2001 (today, the U.S. steel industry employs only 200,000 people).  
File: PRIEST base macro final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 11:21 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
1028 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
world’s economic ills, so quickly turn his back on the tenets of 
globalization? 17    
The answer, without chalking the President’s actions up as 
another example of a politician not living up to his campaign 
promises, lies in the idea that democracy and capitalism (the 
seed from which the concept of globalized free trade has sprung) 
simply may not make good bedfellows.18  This problem has 
plagued politicians in the U.S. throughout its history,19 and it 
comes to the forefront once again in the analysis of President 
Bush’s steel tariffs.  Unfortunately, the possibility that democ-
racy and capitalism do not co-exist in harmony, in and of itself, 
does little to explain the reasoning behind the President’s ac-
tions.  More importantly though, it gives foreign companies and 
their investors no basis upon which to evaluate the risks of fu-
ture investments in the steel industry that might depend on the 
availability of U.S. markets.20   
The purpose of this note is to shed light on the reasoning be-
hind President Bush’s imposition of steel tariffs, and to analyze 
whether imposing tariffs was justified under the circumstances.  
  
 17. Jamie Dettmer, Steel Strikes a Blow Against Free Trade, INSIGHT MAG., 
Apr. 1, 2002, at 47  (President Bush began as a champion of free trade, but, as 
always, domestic politics have a nasty habit of getting in the way of free 
trade). 
 18. Lester Thurow, New Rules: The American Economy in the Next Cen-
tury, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY 244, 250 
(Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Thurow, New Rules].  New 
Rules discusses the changing role of the U.S. on the world stage.  Thurow 
argues that, while globalized free trade is a golden opportunity for the top 
20% of the population, for the rest it will lead to lower wages and a lower 
standard of living.  Id.  The disproportionate nature of these benefits can only 
lead to problems in a democracy such as ours.  Id. 
 19. See Stephen P. Magee and Leslie Young, Endogenous Protection in the 
United States, 1900–1984, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD 
ECONOMY at 145, 146–48 (Robert M. Stern, ed., 1988) [hereinafter Magee and 
Young, Endogenous Protection] (two thirds of the changes in U.S. tariffs this 
century are explained by economic variables such as unemployment, inflation, 
and the U.S. terms of trade). 
 20. See John H. Jackson, Multilateral and Bilateral Negotiating Ap-
proaches for the Conduct of U.S. Trade Policies, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A 
CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 377, 393 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988) [hereinafter, 
Jackson, Multilateral and Bilateral Negotiating Approaches] (the influence of 
narrow interests in the U.S. makes foreign governments nervous about the 
effective commitment of the U.S. toward an international system of rules re-
garding trade and other economic matters). 
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This note will examine both the consequences of imposing tar-
iffs on steel products,21 and the question of whether the steel 
industry is actually deserving of governmental protection.22   
In order to properly evaluate the wisdom of the President’s 
decision to impose tariffs, this note will first outline the context 
of the President’s action.  Section II will begin with a descrip-
tion of the history of arguments for and against free trade, and 
end with a look at historical uses of trade restrictions that have 
benefited the steel industry.23  The actual analysis of the Presi-
dent’s actions will then proceed along two semi-separate paths 
of inquiry.   
The first path of inquiry, in Section III, is the economic 
analysis, but, since the U.S. government’s steel policy is inextri-
cably linked to the political realm,24 it will undoubtedly touch on 
some issues that are political in nature.  The main question in 
  
 21. Article 8, ¶ 1 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, provides for com-
pensation to countries affected by safeguard measures in the form of conces-
sions or other “adequate means of trade compensation.”  Agreement on Safe-
guards, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_browseDetail.asp? 
preprog=3, reprinted in 1995 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THIRD EDITION 295, 299 (John H. Jack-
son, et al. eds., 1995), [hereinafter, Agreement on Safeguards].  Article 14 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards gives authority on dispute settlement to the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.  Id.  The question of whether President 
Bush’s steel tariffs will incur these penalties will be discussed infra at Section 
III. 
 22. Arguments of U.S. steel producers will be looked at in light of the ef-
fects of tariffs on steel consumers, and the general economy, in order to come 
to a conclusion on this question.  This analysis is borne out of the Section 201 
requirement that actions “provide greater economic and social benefits than 
costs.”  Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975)). 
 23. Much of the information in this section was gleaned from the works of 
William A. Lovett, a staunch critic of the U.S.’s trade policy, and advocate for 
a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO.  See WILLIAM A. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE 
POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 56 (1999); William A. Lovett, The 
WTO: A Train Wreck in Progress, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 410, 425–26 (Nov.–
Dec. 2000); William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Inter-
ests: Implementing the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 951, 961 (2002). 
 24. See THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP INC., BCG REPORT, BREAKING THE 
STALEMATE: VALUE CREATION STRATEGIES FOR THE GLOBAL STEEL INDUSTRY 
(July 2002), at 7, at http://www.bcg.com [hereinafter BCG REPORT] (many 
decisions made by steel industry managers over the last 20 years have been 
based not on economic reasoning, but on the presumption that the govern-
ment would provide some degree of protection to their companies). 
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the economic analysis of this note is whether President Bush 
could rightly impose steel tariffs — under either Section 201 of 
the Trade Act of 1974,25 or under the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) Agreement on Safeguards.26  Statistics provided by 
U.S. steel producers, along with an analysis of historical trends 
in the steel industry, will provide a factual basis for the conclu-
sions of this Note.  The results of this factual analysis will then 
be compared with the language of the Trade Act of 1974 and the 
WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, in order to determine the va-
lidity of the President’s actions.  Economic analysis of the steel 
industry will show that the President’s imposition of steel tar-
iffs is not likely to be justified by a WTO dispute resolution 
panel, and will therefore result in compensation in the form of 
tariffs imposed by damaged nations on products of their choos-
ing.27  This section will also make clear the fact that, when 
weighed against their effect on steel consumers in the U.S. and 
the likely WTO sanctions, President Bush’s steel tariffs cannot 
satisfy the requirement of Section 201 that any action under-
taken “provide greater economic and social benefits than 
costs.”28 
  
 25. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201). 
 26. The Agreement on Safeguards requires members of the WTO to use 
safeguards “only if that Member has determined . . . that such product is be-
ing imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or rela-
tive to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten 
to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly 
competitive products.”  Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 21, at Article 2 
¶1.  If U.S. steel tariffs are deemed a violation of WTO rules, under Article 22 
of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, appropriate compensation 
would have to be paid, either in the form of reducing other trade barriers, or 
by allowing the affected countries to institute tariffs on other products as they 
see fit.  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1995, art. 22 ¶¶ 1–3, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex Z, 31 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
 27. See supra note 21; see also CNN/World, EC Compiles U.S. Tariff ‘Hit’ 
List (June 5, 2002) at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/06/05/eu. 
tariffs/index.html (E.U. approved a list of goods — including textiles, steel, 
and orange juice — which it plans on ‘hitting’ with retaliatory sanctions in 
response to U.S. steel tariffs). 
 28. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201). 
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The second path of inquiry, in Section IV, will be termed the 
political analysis, although this analysis will incorporate some 
decidedly economic issues.29  On the political side of the issue, 
this note will first examine the reasons behind the steel indus-
try’s formidable clout in the political arena. 30  It will then ex-
plain the problems facing the American industrial worker, and 
the middle class in general, as they relate to economic global-
ization.31  This section of the note will also analyze the benefits 
of protecting the steel industry versus the political costs, both at 
home and abroad, that the U.S. has incurred in choosing to im-
pose sanctions.  Finally, this section will look at the steel indus-
try’s importance as an element of America’s national defense.32  
Because steel production is a necessity in times of war — to pro-
  
 29. The economic issues discussed in the political analysis section will be 
theory-based, and serve to explain why steel workers, and industrial workers 
in general, are rightly worried about the impact of globalization on their way 
of life.  See infra Section IV. 
 30. See ECONOMIST, supra note 16 (although steel imports account for only 
2% of imported products into the U.S. each year, 46% of U.S. anti-dumping 
measures relate to steel products). The reasons behind the steel industry’s 
disproportionate clout are both historical and contemporary.  U.S. steel built 
many of the symbols of American dominance, and the donations of Andrew 
Carnegie, and others like him, still support cultural institutions throughout 
the east coast and the mid-west.  Steel has a place in the hearts of many vot-
ers in swing states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.  See Mi-
chael Buchanan, Analysis: Politics of Steel, BBC NEWS, at http:// 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1857207.stm.  This makes ignoring 
the plight of big steel a risky political move.  Some political analysts believe 
that Bill Clinton’s failure to renew Voluntary Export Restrictions on steel 
caused Al Gore’s defeat, especially in West Virginia.  Id. 
 31. See LESTER THUROW, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM: HOW TODAY’S 
ECONOMIC FORCES SHAPE TOMORROW’S WORLD 75–78 (1996).  The American 
premium for unskilled labor has disappeared.  Real per capita growth rose 
40% from 1970 to 1996, while 60% of the workforce, in 1995, was working for 
real wages below previous peaks.  Id.   This implies that America was com-
petitively successful in this period, but a majority of its workers were not.  Id. 
 32. See Facts About Steel: Preserving a Strategic American Industry (Cus-
tomer brochure from “Stand Up for Steel”) (Sept. 30, 2002), at 
http://www.steel.org/ 
facts/c3.pdf [hereinafter Facts About Steel]; see also Increase of Steel Imports: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 1999 WL 107124 (Feb. 25, 1999) (Statement of George Becker, Presi-
dent, United Steelworkers of America) [hereinafter Statement of George 
Becker] (“Steelworkers have made the steel that has built America and de-
fended this nation throughout its history.”). 
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provide the raw material for everything from planes to bombs 
— many supporters argue that the steel industry is not only 
vital for the economic well-being of America, but also for Amer-
ica’s survival as a nation.33 
In conclusion, Section V of this note will argue that the Presi-
dent’s imposition of steel tariffs was an unwise decision on both 
the economic and political levels.34  By imposing tariffs on steel 
imports, President Bush has not only passed the costs of right-
ing the ailing U.S. steel industry onto domestic steel consum-
ers,35 but he has also used up important international good will 
at a time when he cannot afford to do so.  In making this deci-
sion, the President over-estimated the political capital of the 
steel producing industry, and under-estimated the overall ef-
fects of imposing tariffs.36 
II. U.S. TRADE HISTORY, AND FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE 
PRESIDENT’S IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS 
The U.S. has been grappling with the question of how to bal-
ance the protection of America’s industrial base, with the inher-
ent unfairness of trade restrictions, since its birth as a nation.37  
This balancing act has become especially relevant in the last 
year, as the debate over the U.S. government’s prolonged pro-
tection of the domestic steel industry has once again heated 
up.38  In order to fully understand the arguments for and 
  
 33. The idea of fostering independence as a rational for protecting indus-
trial capacity was espoused in the trade policies of the founding fathers.  See 
Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy as Foreign Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN 
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 291, 292 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988).  Adam 
Smith also cited national defense as a worthy reason for instituting restrictive 
trade measures in his treatise entitled, “Wealth of Nations.”  ADAM SMITH, 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 429–31 (1776).  
 34. See Thomas G. Donlan, Editorial, Caving In for Steel: President Bush 
Puts Political Advantage Ahead of Competitiveness, BARRON’S, Mar. 11, 2002, 
at 43. 
 35. Id. 
 36. This is evident in the back-tracking that has gone on since the tariffs 
were instituted, and in the recent preliminary decision by the WTO ruling 
against President Bush’s tariffs on steel.  See infra Part V. 
 37. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 56–57. 
 38. See generally Donlan, supra note 34, at 43 (the U.S. has imposed quo-
tas, import restraints and price-fixing on steel imports — and given the do-
mestic steel industry financial aid, technical assistance, tax shelters and other 
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against using trade restrictions to protect the steel industry, a 
review of the evolution of the U.S.’s international trade policy is 
necessary.  After a synopsis of U.S. international trade policy, 
this section will look to the historical uses of trade restrictions 
benefiting the steel industry.  The fact that the steel industry 
has been granted protection so many times in the past is one of 
the main points of contention between those who favor and 
those who oppose the imposition of tariffs.39  It is only after a 
review of these historical factors that a comprehensive analysis 
of President Bush’s steel tariffs may begin. 
Arguments between protectionists and those in favor of free 
trade have persisted in America since the days of the Revolu-
tionary War.40  Luminaries such as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Jefferson, and John Adams all shared a passion for the notion of 
free trade.41  Their interest in free trade was, however, balanced 
by their skepticism towards relying too heavily on trading part-
ners who had already established their sovereignty.42  This 
skepticism was elucidated in Alexander Hamilton’s “Report on 
  
subsidies worth anywhere from $20 billion to $50 billion over the past 30 
years); Neil King Jr. and Robert Guy Matthews, So Far, Steel Tariffs do Little 
of what President Envisioned, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at A1 (since 1968, 
federal efforts to protect the steel industry from imports have cost steel users 
$120 billion); see also Press Release, American Institute for International 
Steel, Inc., Steel Trade Policy (Oct. 19, 2002), available at 
www.aiis.org/steelpolicy.html (the U.S. government used quota protection in 
the 1960’s, price controls in the 1970’s, absolute quotas in the 1980’s and early 
1990’s, and, most recently, anti-dumping laws to inhibit competition with U.S. 
steel producers).  
 39. Compare Statement of George Becker, supra note 32 (trade restrictions 
exist to protect U.S. steel workers from losing their livelihoods, and their way 
of life — those who feel otherwise have not seen the painful results of past 
failures to protect the steel industry), with Editorial, Free Trade Over a Bar-
rel, WALL ST. J. EUR., July, 12, 2002, at A10 (“Big steel has been given half a 
dozen chances in the past 30 years to slim down and speed up behind various 
tariff and quota walls.  The industry then uses up one of its politically granted 
nine lives and keeps coming back for more.”).  See also supra note 38. 
 40. It has been argued that the main reasons behind the Revolutionary 
War were the numerous disputes over trade policy between the Colonies and 
Great Britain (e.g., the Boston Tea Party and the Townshend Act, etc.).  Coo-
per, supra note 33, at 291. 
 41. Id.  In 1774, Jefferson espoused that “free trade with all parts of the 
world” was a “natural right” that no law could ever supplant.  Id. 
 42. Id.  The main fear, shared by Jefferson and Adams, was a lack of 
reciprocity from the U.S.’s trading partners, in particular, France.  Id.  
File: PRIEST base macro final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 11:21 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
1034 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
Manufactures,” which although predominantly protectionist in 
its tone, set forth arguments on both sides of the dispute over 
trade restrictions that are still echoed today.43  Hamilton’s ap-
proach was that America should base its trade policy not on 
economic goals, but on the prospect of augmenting the fledgling 
nationhood of the former colonies.44  At the time, this approach 
called for protection of America’s growing industrial base 
through the use of trade restrictions.45  Hamilton did recognize, 
however, that restrictions on trade should last only until the 
fledgling industry became self-sufficient — after such time, he 
believed those measures were evidence of  “natural and inher-
ent impediments to success” in that industry.46  It is within this 
framework that many of the arguments over the U.S. govern-
ment’s steel policy take place to this day.47 
The U.S. approach to international trade shifted around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, from promoting its own 
nationhood to promoting the sale of its products abroad.48  The 
U.S. government imposed considerable tariffs on all imports 
from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1930’s.49  During this 
period, American steel played an enormous role in the develop-
ment of the U.S. as a world superpower.50  In fact, the great 
  
 43. See INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 264--66. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 292.  The full text of Hamilton’s comment is as follows:  “The 
continuance of bounties on manufactures long established, must almost al-
ways be of questionable policy: because a presumption would arise, in every 
such case, that there were natural and inherent impediments to success.  But, 
in new undertakings, they are as justifiable as they are oftentimes necessary.”  
Id. 
 47. See supra note 39, comparing the contemporary views of steel industry 
supporters with those of opponents of continued protection. 
 48. Cooper, supra note 33, at 291–92. 
 49. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 69--73 (tariffs on imports during this period ranged from 25–
50%).  The period from 1889–1929 was, despite extremely high tariffs on im-
ports, the most rapid period of growth that the American economy has ever 
experienced — on average, the economy grew 3.6% per year during this pe-
riod.  Id. at 60.  While this was a period of development for the U.S., it is cited 
as evidence that protectionist practices are not always bad for the economy as 
a whole. Id.   
 50. See generally PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE (2002). 
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steel magnates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury built most of the infrastructure that powered our country 
through the Industrial Revolution.51  Interestingly, while being 
protected by considerable tariffs on imports during this period, 
U.S. steel companies used “differential pricing” policies abroad 
in order to capture market-share.52  The zenith of U.S. tariff 
practice during this period came in the form of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.53  It is widely believed that the 
Smoot-Hawley Act was one of the main catalysts of the Great 
Depression, as its effects reverberated throughout world mar-
kets by effectively forcing other countries to impose the same 
levels of tariffs.54  This choked off the flow of world trade, which 
led to global recession, and, arguably, to World War II.55   
America’s post-World War II policy on international trade 
was one of promoting full employment and growth, both of 
which were conducive to non-turbulent politics and harmony 
between countries.56  This new policy was both a response to the 
events leading up to World War II, and to the rising threat of 
communism from the Soviet Union.57  In this policy shift, the 
changing role of the U.S. on the world stage can also be seen.  
In less than half a century, America evolved from a developing 
  
 51. James Arnold, Steel sector stares into the abyss, BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 
2002), at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1857914.stm.  
 52. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 67.  “Differential pricing” would likely be deemed dumping 
by today’s standards. 
 53. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.).  See also Cooper, supra note 33, at 291–92.  The Smoot-Hawley 
Act raised already high tariffs on imports by 40%–50%.  Many economists 
believe the Smoot-Hawley Act was the eventual cause of the world-wide 
Depression of the mid-1930’s.  Id. 
 54. See id. at 298. 
 55. Id.  In his memoirs, Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1933–1944) had 
this to say on the importance of trade after Smoot-Hawley:  “From then on, to 
me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and 
unfair economic competition, with war.  If we could get fewer discriminations 
and obstructions [to trade] so that one country would not be deadly jealous of 
another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminat-
ing the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable 
chance for a lasting peace.”  Id. at 299. 
 56. Id. at 291–92. 
 57. Id. at 298–302. 
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nation, to one of only two nations vying for dominance on the 
world stage.   
The end of World War II also brought on the most important 
development in world trade to that point — the signing of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (“GATT”).58  
The GATT, and its granting of most favored nation (“MFN”) 
status to all its members, was designed to insulate imports of 
foreign goods from manipulation for reasons of foreign policy or 
domestic economic policy.59  The signing of the GATT ushered in 
a new era of trade policy for the U.S., one where foreign policy 
interests took precedence over other considerations when it 
came to international trade.60  Coupled with the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, the GATT brought about 
an unprecedented liberalization of trade and financial flows.61  
This, in turn, resulted in worldwide economic growth on a scale 
that had never before been seen.62 
As the GATT evolved,63 the onus of setting the example for 
free market economies was shouldered almost exclusively by 
  
 58. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 78–79.  
 59. Cooper, supra note 33, at 301.  Of course, membership in GATT, by 
itself, became a political tool with which the Western world attempted to ma-
nipulate their Cold War communist rivals.  Id. 
 60. LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 78.  See also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: 
LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 11–14 (2002) [here-
inafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM].   
 61. Together — GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank — are referred to as 
the Bretton Woods System.  JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra 
note 60, at 7.  
 62. Id.  However, this explosive growth was not experienced in many east-
ern bloc countries, as MFN status was rescinded from all Communist coun-
tries in 1951.  MFN status would become one of the most important, and oft-
used weapons of the Cold War.  Cooper, supra note 33, at 302. 
 63. To date, there have been three more completed rounds of negotiation — 
the Kennedy Round (1964–1967) the Tokyo Round (1973--1979), and the Uru-
guay Round (1989–1994).  LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, 
THEORY, AND THE WTO, supra note 23, at 81–82, 87–88, 101–03.  The Uruguay 
Round culminated with the creation of the WTO, and accompanying agree-
ments on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards, Trade in Ser-
vices, Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) and Dispute Settlement.  Id. at 
101. 
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the U.S.64  The result of America leading the way for free mar-
kets was that U.S. markets were the most open in the world — 
this led to lower prices for consumers, but also to an increase in 
imports, which caused employees in domestic industries to lose 
their jobs.65  So, as U.S. markets opened further, the livelihoods 
of U.S. workers became some of the more notable casualties of 
the Cold War.66  
The steel industry began to feel the pressure from increased 
competition in the 1960’s.  In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson 
instituted the first trade restrictions specifically designed to 
benefit the U.S. steel industry.67  Johnson imposed voluntary 
export restrictions (“VER’s”) on steel products from Europe and 
Japan in response to an increase in imports.  Johnson’s “volun-
tary” restraints were meant to give the domestic steel industry 
breathing room to restructure its businesses.68  These restraints 
on steel trade were allowed to lapse in 1974, and another steel 
crisis immediately followed.69  In 1977, President Jimmy Carter 
approved minimum “fair value” prices for steel imports through 
the “trigger price mechanism,” in order to combat a dearth of 
  
 64. See PAUL VOLCKER & TOYOO GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE 
WORLD’S MONEY AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 189 (1992) (Trade 
Policy leaders believed that the U.S. had a responsibility to put the perceived 
interests of the economic system ahead of the short-term concerns of U.S. 
producers and workers throughout the Cold War).  
 65. Id.  See also JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 60, at 
17. 
 66. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 105.  See also THUROW, supra note 31, at 75–78 (the wage-
premium that industrial workers in America had enjoyed for so long disap-
peared gradually from the 1970’s to mid-1990’s). 
 67. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMINISTRATION, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE — STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE 
SOLUTIONS 5 (2000), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/steelreport 
726.html [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE].  These 
restrictions took the form of Voluntary Export Restrictions (“VERs”).  While 
these restrictions were deemed “voluntary,” this was a misnomer, as the pen-
alties for not complying with the export restrictions were steep.  King Jr. & 
Matthews, supra note 38.  This type of trade restriction was explicitly banned 
by the Agreement on Safeguards, signed in 1994.  Agreement on Safeguards, 
supra note 21.  
 68. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38. 
 69. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5.  
See also Statement of George Becker, supra note 32 (during the steel crisis of 
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s over 350,000 steelworkers lost their jobs). 
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low-priced steel products from Japan.70  This attempt to curb 
imports of steel was largely ineffective, and did little to stave off 
the painful restructuring of the U.S. steel industry that took 
place in the 1980’s.71  President Ronald Reagan intervened in 
1984, and once again imposed “voluntary” restraints on Japa-
nese and European steel exports.72  The idea, once again, was to 
give the U.S. steel industry breathing room to restructure and 
once again become a viable industry in the face of the major 
changes brought about by U.S. international trade policy.73  
George H.W. Bush extended Reagan’s VER’s during his term as 
President, thereby granting the steel industry a full decade of 
relief from low-priced imports.74   
This time, the breathing room seemed to work, and new tech-
nology once again made U.S. steel producers some of the most 
efficient in the world.75  By the time Bill Clinton became Presi-
dent in 1992, the U.S. steel industry appeared to be on the road 
to recovery after almost ten years of restructuring.76  Despite 
these signs of recovery, however, complaints about unfair com-
petition from abroad continued.77  In 1994, President Clinton 
  
 70. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5; 
King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38. 
 71. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 5.  
See also Statement of George Becker, supra note 32.  During this period of 
restructuring “steelworkers went from being taxpayers to being recipients of 
unemployment insurance, food stamps, and welfare payments from federal, 
state, and local governments.”  Id. 
 72. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38.  As noted earlier, the term “volun-
tary” does not accurately describe these trade restrictions, as countries were 
forced by the consequences of not complying with the VER’s to capitulate. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 7 
(led by “mini-mills” such as Nucor, Inc., the U.S. became a world leader in low 
cost steel production in the 1990’s).  See also In America’s Fiery Furnace, 
ECONOMIST, Sep. 17, 1998.  Using electric-arc furnaces and scrap metal, “mini-
mills” now account for almost 40% of American steel production.  Id.  While 
“mini-mills” produce only low-grade steel at present, their technology is im-
proving rapidly.  Id. 
 76. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 6 (in 
the late 80’s and early 90’s the U.S. steel industry raised productivity by more 
than 300%, and eliminated 330,000 jobs). 
 77. Id. at 5–6. 
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allowed the last of the VER’s to lapse,78 and the steel industry 
was once again exposed to unencumbered international compe-
tition.  The results for the U.S. steel industry were not favor-
able.  Further discussion of steel policy in the latter Clinton 
years will follow in the two analysis sections of this note.79 
At present, as evidenced by the Bush administration’s opaque 
policy regarding international trade, the U.S. economic stance 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world has become unclear.80  The Soviet 
Union and communism no longer stand as a viable alternative 
to democracy.81  The U.S. is now the world’s lone superpower, 
and the need to subsidize our allies by sustaining the world’s 
most open markets has decreased drastically.82  The forces be-
hind our confused international trade policies are as clear as 
they are divergent.  Protectionism has become the rallying cry 
of American industrial workers, while large corporations — ea-
ger to take advantage of the cost savings available in a wider 
market — are constant promoters of globalized free trade.83  
American workers have been steadily losing ground in terms of 
wage premiums for the last forty years, and their anger will 
inevitably return to the forefront as foreign policy concerns 
move to the rear.84   
  
 78. As mentioned earlier, VER’s became illegal under the WTO’s Agree-
ment on Safeguards, so their extension was not a viable option for President 
Clinton.  See Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 21. 
 79. See infra Sections III, IV. 
 80. See Timothy M. Reif and Viji Rangaswami, Joltin’ Joe has Left and 
Gone Away – Embracing change: The way forward for U.S. trade policy and 
the WTO, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 427, 429 (2001) [hereinafter Reif & Ra-
naswami] (Citing polls that suggest a “growing disconnect between policy 
elites and the public with respect to the purpose, objectives, and benefits of 
U.S. trade policy.”). 
 81. George Soros, The Capitalist Threat, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 
46. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Jeffrey Sachs, International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of 
Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY 217, 
218 (Patrick O’Meara et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sachs, International Eco-
nomics]. 
 84. See Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 252.  The majority of indus-
trial workers in the U.S. facing lower real earnings will sooner or later become 
disaffected with democracy.  Id.  This is a major economic and political di-
lemma facing the U.S. in the 21st century.  Id. 
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With the formation of the European Union (“EU”), and the 
promulgation of its common currency, the euro, some scholars 
believe we will not be alone at the top of the economic heap for 
long.85  China could also be hot on the heels of the U.S., as its 
recent entrance into the WTO will eliminate many of the hin-
drances to expansion that previously held it back.86  America 
needs to quickly find common ground between the protectionist 
instincts of its worker/voters and the capitalist desires of big 
business and politicians.  If it cannot, we are in danger of not 
only losing our economic dominance, but also of reverting back 
to a policy of all-out protectionism, not seen since the 1930’s.87   
The U.S. steel industry has relied heavily on financial sup-
port and trade protection from the U.S. government for the past 
four decades, and its needs are once again at the forefront of our 
international trade policy.88  Job losses in the steel-making in-
dustry have averaged five thousand per year since 2000,89 and 
thirty-one steel companies have filed for bankruptcy protection 
since 1998.90  The U.S. steel industry faced global competition 
without major governmental assistance for the last six years, 
and its overall competitiveness has been found wanting again.91  
This phenomenon begs the question — is the steel industry 
worthy of another grant of breathing room, or is it finally time 
to say, let the markets do what they will?  The following two 
sections will attempt to answer these questions, while keeping 
in mind the U.S. steel industry’s storied past, and also consider-
  
 85. Id at 247-48. 
 86. Hugo Restall, Examining Asia: Who will push free trade? ASIAN WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at A11. 
 87. See Thomas Bray, Bush caves in to political temptation, THE DETROIT 
NEWS, Mar. 20, 2002, at 13 (President Bush lit “a dangerous fuse” by imposing 
tariffs, and it is one that history shows will be hard to put out); see Aaron 
Bernstein, Backlash: Behind the Anxiety Over Globalization, BUS. WK., Apr. 
24, 2000 (“68% of Americans believe globalization drags down U.S. wages.”).  
See also Keith W. Hammonds, Freer Trade Gets an Unfriendly Reception, BUS. 
WK., Sept. 22, 1997, at 34 (Harris Poll Results:  56% of those polled believe 
expanded international trade leads to a decrease in the number of U.S. jobs).  
Also, recall discussion of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, at supra note 53.   
 88. See BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7. 
 89. ECONOMIST, supra note 16. 
 90. CNN/Europe, Bush backs steel tariffs (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http:// 
europe.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/03/05/steel/index.html. 
 91. See BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7. 
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ing the decline of U.S. industrial workers in general over the 
same period.    
III. PRESIDENT BUSH’S USE OF SECTION 201 — AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
The economic analysis of the Bush administration’s steel tar-
iffs begins with a close look at the requirements of Section 201 
of the Trade Act of 1974.  The Bush administration claims that 
Section 201 was enacted in 1974 to give the Executive Branch 
the power to do exactly what President Bush has done in the 
instant case — impose tariffs in order to safeguard an American 
industry.92   Tariffs on steel were implemented based on the 
premise that U.S. steel companies were caused “substantial in-
jury” as a result of a surge in steel imports.93  This section fo-
cuses on the idea that the troubles facing steel manufacturers 
are not the result of increased quantities of imports, as required 
by Section 201; but, rather, they are the result of a downturn in 
the global steel market that has magnified the challenges faced 
by U.S. steel manufacturers who must already cope with higher 
than average production and transportation costs.94  The eco-
nomic analysis section will conclude that the President’s impo-
sition of sanctions in retaliation for increased quantities of im-
ports was a misuse of the power granted by Section 201, and 
should therefore be rescinded.95   
In order to come to this conclusion, this section will analyze 
the claims put forth in the realm of the WTO dispute resolution 
  
 92. See Robert Zoellick, Editorial, The Reigning Champions of Free Trade, 
FIN TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002. 
 93. USEU Report, supra note 2.  See also Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) 
(Section 201). 
 94. See Arnold, supra note 51 (“While it costs $293 to produce a ton of hot-
rolled coil steel in the U.S., it costs just $212 in the former Soviet Union, and 
$185 in Brazil.”).  See also, BBC News, Trade War Looms over Steel Dispute, 
supra note 5.  Steel jobs have decreased in the U.S., the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and the rest of the European Union in the past four years:  the U.S. 
steel industry has lost 20,000 jobs; the U.K. steel industry has lost 10,000 
jobs; Germany has lost 7,900 steel jobs; and the EU has lost a total of 22,200 
jobs since 1998.  Id. 
 95. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201 requires that any 
action “provide greater economic and social benefits than costs”). 
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mechanism.   While the language of the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards is similar to the language of Section 201 — there 
are slight differences, which make the standard for implement-
ing safeguards under the umbrella of the WTO less stringent 
than that used by the U.S. government.96  As this section will 
show, President Bush’s sanctions will be invalidated under the 
less stringent standards used by the WTO, and will inevitably 
draw retaliatory sanctions aimed at other, more viable indus-
tries.97  This is the most compelling reason why the President’s 
imposition of tariffs cannot satisfy Section 201, since it requires 
that the economic benefits not outweigh the costs of any ac-
tion.98  When measured with WTO sanctions in mind, the Presi-
dent’s action fails this test.  
To begin, a clear understanding of the requirements that Sec-
tion 201 places on the imposition of tariffs is needed.  The 
President made his original request for an investigation into 
the effects of imports on the American steel industry to the In-
ternational Trade Commission (“Commission”) in June, 2001.99  
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 reads as follows: 
Sec. 201. Action to Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Import 
Competition 
(a) Presidential action. If the United States International 
Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to in this chapter 
  
 96. Compare Article 2, ¶ 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards (at supra note 
26), with the language of Section 201 above.  Note that requirements of the 
Agreement on Safeguards are considered less stringent than those of Section 
201 because there is no obligation that the safeguards “provide greater eco-
nomic and social benefits than costs.”  Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 
88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975)) (Section 
201).  
 97. Dettmer, supra note 17, at 47.  See also CNN/World, EC Compiles U.S. 
Tariff ‘Hit’ List, supra note 27 (the EC’s ‘hit list’ of goods includes textiles, 
steel, and orange juice).  This inevitable rejection by the WTO, coupled with 
the U.S.’ tougher standard for the imposition of tariffs, again begs the ques-
tion, why?  The answers apparently cannot be found in economic analysis — 
see Section IV, infra for another explanation. 
 98. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)). 
 99. USEU Report, supra note 2. 
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as the “Commission”) determines under section 202(b)100 
that an article is being imported into the United States in 
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of 
serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic indus-
try producing an article like or directly competitive with 
the imported article, the President, in accordance with this 
chapter, shall take all appropriate and feasible action 
within his power which the President determines will fa-
cilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive 
adjustment to import competition and provide greater eco-
nomic and social benefits than costs.101  
The most important phrases of Section 201, for the purposes 
of this note, are “in such increased quantities as to be a sub-
stantial cause of serious injury,” and “provide greater economic 
and social benefits than costs.”  Both phrases, when examined 
further, lead to the conclusion that the steel tariffs imposed by 
President Bush are not in compliance with the requirements 
imposed by Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
President Bush’s administration was not the first to examine 
the most recent surge of imports and its effects on the U.S. steel 
industry.  Just two years before President Bush began the proc-
ess of imposing tariffs, the U.S. Department of Commerce pub-
lished a 235-page report, prepared for the Clinton administra-
tion, entitled “Global Steel Trade — Structural Problems and 
Future Solutions” (the “Clinton Report”).102  The Clinton Report 
provided a comprehensive analysis of the 70% increase of steel 
imports in 1998, against the backdrop of a 25% decrease in av-
erage steel prices.103  Interestingly, this report concluded that 
the majority of this increase in imports came from South Korea, 
Japan, Russia, and Brazil.104  Notably, this list does not include 
Great Britain, Germany, Australia or China, all four of whom 
faced substantial exposure to the Bush administration’s tariff 
schedule.105   
  
 100. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 202(b) — Investigations 
and determinations by commission). 
 101. Id. 
 102. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 1. 
 103. Id. at 1. 
 104. Id. at 2. 
 105. See BBC News, Trade War Looms Over Steel Dispute, supra note 5.  
Perhaps more interesting than the inclusion of E.U. countries, along with 
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The Clinton Report took a decidedly different approach to re-
sponding to the surge of imports.  It chose to focus on the prob-
lems with the global steel market in general, and on the new 
“mini-mill” steel companies that were driving the U.S. towards 
becoming a world leader in low cost steel production.106  The 
Clinton Report concluded that the main problem with the steel 
industry in the U.S. is not imports, but global over-capacity in 
general.107  In response to this report, President Clinton decided 
to forego a major interruption in the steel market (i.e. the impo-
sition of tariffs), in favor of bilateral negotiations aimed at re-
ducing global overcapacity.108  The Clinton Report also stated 
that, by early 2000, while prices were still low, the U.S. steel 
industry was well on its way to recovery, as domestic shipments 
were once again on the upswing.109 
Data on steel imports from 1999–2001 lends credence to the 
Clinton Report’s findings.  According to the American Iron and 
Steel Institute,110 total imports of steel mill products111 in 1999 
were 35,731,000 tons.112  In 2000, total imports of steel mill 
products rose 6.2% to 37,957,000 tons — a slight increase.113  
Surprisingly, in the year 2001, when the Commission was de-
termining whether an increase in steel imports was damaging 
domestic manufacturers, imports of steel mill products fell 
  
Australia and China, in President Bush’s tariff plan, is the fact that Brazil 
and Russia will receive more lenient treatment than these countries.  Rust 
Never Sleeps, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2002.  This is despite the fact that the Clin-
ton Report states that the majority of the 1998 import surge came from Korea, 
Japan, Russia, and Brazil.  REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, 
supra note 67, at 2. 
 106. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE, supra note 67, at 4–7. 
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. Id. at 106. 
 109. Id. at 8. 
 110. The American Iron and Steel Institute is a trade group representing 
steel and iron producers across the U.S..  The AISI compiles data and industry 
reports which are available both online at http://www.steel.org and in hard 
copy form. 
 111. All of the products covered by President Bush’s tariffs fall under the 
umbrella of steel mill products.  USEU Report, supra note 2. 
 112. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA 
(2000), at http://www.steel.org/stats/2000.htm.   
 113. Id. 
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20.8% to 30,080,000 tons.114  During the same three-year period, 
total steel production by U.S. manufacturers followed roughly 
the same pattern by increasing 4.5% from 1999 to 2000, and 
falling 11.5% from 2000 to 2001.115  These numbers fail to show 
any surge of imports to which the steel industry could attach 
blame for the general malaise affecting it.  
Furthermore, in the same three-year period, the trade deficit 
(the difference between the amount of steel imported by con-
sumers in the U.S., and the amount of steel exported by U.S. 
steel producers) in the U.S. steel market actually improved.  In 
1999, U.S. steel makers exported 5,426,000 tons of steel, while 
importing 35,731,000 tons.116  These numbers amount to a trade 
deficit of 30,305,000 tons in 1999.  In the year 2000, while im-
ports grew only 6.2% to 37,957,000 tons, steel exports increased 
20.3% to 6,529,000 tons, and created a deficit of 31,428,000 
tons.117  By these numbers, from 1999 to 2000, the trade deficit 
in the U.S. steel market grew only 3.6%.118  More interesting 
than the slight increase in the steel trade deficit from 1999 to 
2000, is the rather large decrease that is seen from 2000 to 
2001.  In 2001, exports decreased 5.9% to 6,144,000 tons of 
steel.119  However, coupled with the aforementioned 20.8% de-
crease in imports to 30,080,000 tons, this gave the U.S. steel 
industry a deficit of 23,936,000 tons.120  This indicates that, 
from 2000 to 2001, the trade deficit in U.S. steel decreased by 
  
 114. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA 
(2001), at http://www.steel.org/stats/2001.htm.  See also Press Release, Ameri-
can Institute for International Steel, AIIS Warns Bush Administration: Cur-
rent Steel Supply Shortage in U.S. Market Threatens Customers; More Pro-
tection Not Needed for Big Steel (Feb. 27, 2002), available at 
http://www.aiis.org/release 
/?file=release92.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002). 
 115. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA, 
supra note 112; AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL 
INDUSTRY DATA, supra note 114.  
 116. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2000 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA, 
supra note 112. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Id.  The author calculated this number on his own, using the AISI’s 
statistics.   
 119. AMERICAN STEEL INSTITUTE, YEAR 2001 SELECTED STEEL INDUSTRY DATA, 
supra note 114. 
 120. Id. 
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24%.121  It is therefore counterintuitive to blame the present 
state of the steel industry on any import surge in the last three 
years.122 
Using these numbers, which were released by the American 
Iron and Steel Institute (a decidedly pro-steel organization123), 
coupled with the report prepared for President Clinton in 2000, 
it is hard to agree with the idea proposed by the Bush admini-
stration that the steel industry has been crippled in recent 
years by a surge in imports.  In fact, it appears as if the position 
of American steel producers was improving relative to foreign 
importers from 1999 to 2001.124 
Complicating the President’s case for Section 201 sanctions 
further, is the state of the steel industry worldwide.  Steel 
prices have been eroding steadily for the past twenty years in 
all parts of the world.125  Despite constant decreases in steel 
prices due to improved technology and the emergence of new, 
lower wage producers, managers of steel companies have con-
tinued to make capital investments and endure ever-increasing 
costs related to labor and retirement benefits.126  This phe-
nomenon is no doubt linked to the presumption that govern-
ments will provide protection in case of the inevitable market 
  
 121. See Id.  The author calculated this number on his own, using the AISI’s 
statistics.  See also Meltdown, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2001 (Citing the fact that, 
as of January, 2001, “imports, which have never accounted for more than 
about a third of American steel consumption, are now at their lowest level in 
years.”). 
 122. See Thomas Fuller, U.S. Agency Rejects New Tariffs on Steel, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 28, 2002 (people are starting to realize that, while the 
steel industry already has protection, steel companies continue to file for pro-
tective measures). 
 123. See Facts About Steel, supra note 32 (report released by the American 
Iron and Steel Institute hailing President Bush’s use of Section 201 safe-
guards, and implying that more should be done to protect domestic steel pro-
ducers in the U.S.). 
 124. See Press Release, American Institute for International Steel, AIIS 
Warns Bush Administration, supra note 114.  A Decline in import supply to 
the U.S., coupled with a slight improvement in demand, created a shortage of 
steel supply in the U.S.  Id.  These factors indicate an improving environment 
for domestic steel producers and vitiate any need for steel tariffs.  Id. 
 125. BCG REPORT, supra note 24, at 7. 
 126. Id. at 5--7 (while the increase of productivity from Russia, Korea, and 
Brazil has, predictably, pushed down global steel prices, steel companies have 
remained blissfully ignorant of this reality).   
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downturns related to operation in a commodity-oriented busi-
ness.127  Again, it is important to note that the imposition of 
steel tariffs will likely lead to the U.S. paying compensation to 
the numerous nations affected by this action under the terms of 
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.128  This likelihood leads to 
the conclusion that the President’s steel tariffs are not in com-
pliance with Section 201.129 
The final point of this section is that, by imposing tariffs on 
steel, the President has shifted the cost of repairing the ailing 
steel producers onto consumers of steel.130  The main consumers 
of the steel affected by President Bush’s tariffs are manufactur-
ers such as Ford, General Motors, and Caterpillar — a much 
larger economic force than the now beleaguered steel indus-
try.131  An increase in the price of steel, of the sort that has been 
brought on by the President’s steel tariffs, affects the price of 
  
 127. Id.  Steel producers are in the commodities business, so they are con-
stantly operating in a cyclical environment.  One of the main problems facing 
the global steel industry is that many steel companies operate as if they are 
oblivious to the cyclical reality of the world in which their companies operate. 
Id at 9.  See In America’s Fiery Furnace, supra note 75 (Because of the breath-
ing room provided by governmental protection, “nobody ever goes bust in the 
American steel industry.”). 
 128. Violation of the Agreement on Safeguards would lead the U.S. into the 
realm of WTO dispute resolution, where “appropriate compensation would 
have to be paid [by the U.S.], either in the form of reducing other trade barri-
ers, or by allowing the affected countries to institute tariffs on other products 
as they see fit.”   DSU, Article 22 ¶¶1, 2, & 3, supra note 26. 
 129. To date, the European Union, Japan, China, South Korea, New Zea-
land, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil have all filed actions before the W.T.O. 
dispute resolution body — they were consolidated as of July 23, 2002.  See 
W.T.O., United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, 2002 WL 1622550, at *1 (July 23, 2002).  Section 201 requires 
that action by the President be taken only when it will “provide greater eco-
nomic and social benefits than costs.”  Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 
88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)).  
 130. Editorial, All hat, no cattle, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2002, at 18.  As a side 
note, it is apparent that many of the U.S.’s major steel producers were facing 
financial crises before the 1998 increase in imports.  See Adam Ritt, The Im-
ports Gremlin, NEWSTEEL, Feb. 1999.  This is another indication that the Clin-
ton Report was correct in its analysis, and in its focus on righting the overca-
pacity problem, rather than imposing further restrictions on the steel indus-
try.  
 131. Editorial, All Hat, No Cattle, supra note 130, at 18. 
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everything from soup cans to heavy machinery.132  While the 
companies that must pay these higher prices will not be put out 
of business, it will affect their margins.133  Companies such as 
Ford and Caterpillar can absorb these costs at present, but if 
there is a larger economic downturn, the smaller margins 
caused by steel tariffs give these much more significant compa-
nies less cushion with which to weather the storm.134   
The point then seems clear — the President has chosen to 
impose tariffs on steel imports, despite evidence that the steel 
industry was in fact turning around, and despite the negative 
effects the tariffs will have on other, more viable industries.  
This stands in direct opposition to the Section 201 requirement 
that the imposition of safeguards “provide greater economic and 
social benefits than costs.”135 
IV. STEEL TARIFFS AND DOMESTIC POLICY — A POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 
President Bush, in contrast with the historical tendency of 
the Republican Party to support free trade, 136 has, so far in his 
first term, not been the champion of free markets he promised 
he would be in his election campaign.137  It seems evident, from 
the facts set forth in the previous section, that the reasoning 
behind the President’s decision to impose steel tariffs cannot be 
divined from purely economic analysis.  While this is not neces-
  
 132. Ed Lotterman, Steel Tariffs Cave to Politics, But Are Bad Economic 
Policy (2002), available at http://www.edlotterman.com/SteelTariffs.htm (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2003). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)). 
 136. See Magee and Young, Endogenous Protection, supra note 19, at 148.  
While the historic stance of the Republican party is one supporting free trade, 
Republican presidents have historically been more supportive of protection.  
Magee and Young believe this is a result of balancing, as Republican policies 
favor high unemployment and low inflation — this is not always a popular 
stance for the President to adopt, especially in tough economic times.  Id. 
 137. See Mora, supra note 9 (Bush  professed unequivocal support for free 
trade during his election campaign); see also Collier, supra note 10, at A3 
(Bush faced numerous tough decisions in the wake of his election as to 
whether or not he would forge ahead with his campaign promise to promote 
free trade).   
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sarily surprising, considering the overall nature of the U.S. po-
litical system, it is problematic in the sense that market-based 
economies like the U.S. require predictability to function at op-
timum levels.138  This section will attempt to identify the politi-
cal factors weighing in on the President’s decision.  After identi-
fying those factors, conclusions will be put forth as to both the 
wisdom of relying on those factors, and the overall effects of do-
ing so.  
Amazingly, despite the steel industry’s precipitous decline in 
the past 40 years, it has managed to retain a powerful political 
front — although steel imports account for only 2% of products 
imported into the U.S. each year, 46% of U.S. anti-dumping 
measures relate to steel products.139  In short, the industry that 
was once the poster-child for American capitalism has become 
the champion of the protectionist movement.140  One reason why 
the steel industry has been so quick to seek governmental sup-
port in the past four decades is that imposing tariffs on steel 
products does not have the same effect as the imposition of tar-
iffs in many other industries.141  In most industries, a tariff that 
restricts imports in order to drive up their price will, by the 
same token, drive down the price of U.S. exports and thereby 
discourage their production.142  But, since the U.S. steel indus-
try does not rely on exports to survive, asking for import relief 
is an attractive option that is normally less so in other indus-
tries.143  
  
 138. See Dean Lebaron, Market Efficiency, Feb. 27, 1999 (Markets are most 
efficient when there are large numbers of well-informed investors.  The 
“noise” of unpredicted events causes markets to be inefficient and unpredict-
able), at http://www.deanlebaron.com/book/ultimate/chapters/mkt_eff.html 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2003). 
 139. ECON OM IST, supra note 16.   
 140. See Regarding GATT Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation and its 
Significance to the Steel Industry:  Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade 
Committee on Ways and Means, Feb. 8, 1994, 1994 WL 14168260 (testimony 
of Joseph Cannon, Chairman of the Board, Geneva Steel, on behalf of the 
American Iron and Steel Institute) (“Since 1980, we have probably used U.S. 
antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws more than any other 
industry. . . .”). 
 141. Avinish Dixit, How Should the United States Respond to Other Coun-
tries’ Trade Policies, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 
at 249, 251 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1988). 
 142. See id.  
 143. See id.   
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The main problem with the U.S. steel industry’s reliance on 
protective measures is that they in turn breed retaliation.144  
This retaliation should then, in a perfect world, have its own 
political ramifications for those who support protective meas-
ures.  One theory of why retaliatory measures have not had the 
requisite amount of negative force to outweigh the positive po-
litical impact of “protecting” an industry is that the true effects 
of trade intervention are not understood by the electorate.145  To 
put it another way, Americans would rather raise tariffs, and 
accept punitive measures in return, than support the domestic 
industry in question through governmental subsidies.146  This 
point sounds like a non-starter, as it would surprise no one to 
find out that Americans — or people of any nation for that mat-
ter — would rather subsidize an ailing industry through the 
imposition of tariffs, than use federal funds for the same pur-
pose.147  The problem is that, while this is obviously politically 
favorable, in the end it is more expensive.148  This solution also 
creates a credibility problem for President Bush on the world 
stage, as his election was largely viewed internationally as a 
victory for free trade, and a sign that U.S. markets would be-
come more open during his term, rather than more restricted.149 
While the President has seemingly damaged his image as a 
champion of free trade with his allegiance to steel producers, 
  
 144. Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey A. Frankel, Macroeconomics and Pro-
tection, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, at 82 (Robert 
M. Stern, ed., The MIT Press, 1988) [hereinafter Dornbusch & Frankel, Mac-
roeconomics and Protection]. 
 145. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy:  
An Overview, in U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 17, 41 
(Robert M. Stern ed., 1988) [hereinafter Deardorff & Stern, Current Issues in 
Trade Policy].  If the public will not protect an industry with subsidies, maybe 
that should be taken to mean the industry should not be protected.  Id.   Pro-
tection has the same effects as a subsidy, but it also inflicts further damage on 
other parts of the economy.  Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note 
144, at 112. 
 148. Deardorff & Stern, Current Issues in Trade Policy, supra note 145, at 
38.  Tariffs are a form of exploitative intervention that presents governments 
with a “Hobson’s choice.”  Any country can use the tariff at the expense of 
other countries, but if all countries use tariffs, they are all likely to lose in the 
end.  Id. 
 149. See supra note 5 for the reaction of the U.S.’s major trading partners. 
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the benefit of that allegiance may in fact be his election.  Look-
ing to the state of West Virginia, it is surprising that George W. 
Bush was able to carry the state in the 2000 Presidential elec-
tion.  West Virginia has two Democratic senators, one of whom, 
Robert Byrd, has been in office for over forty years.150  West 
Virginia, however, is also the state whose fortunes have histori-
cally been most closely aligned with that of the steel industry.151  
Because of its small size, steel issues — as well as coal — are 
able to dominate the political landscape of West Virginia.  As it 
turns out, the state of West Virginia carries five electoral votes 
— all five of which went to George W. Bush in the 2000 elec-
tion.152  This number seems miniscule until Bush’s margin of 
victory is noted — that margin was five electoral votes.153  
The steel industry is forced to rely on its political capital, and 
the sympathetic nature of its cause to insure protection in 
largely because of its former dominance.  U.S. steel workers are 
among the highest paid industrial workers in the world.154  This 
fact is a reflection of strong union power in the steel industry 
and a long tradition of automatic productivity raises.155  Unfor-
tunately, those wages have been out of line with actual produc-
tivity growth and economy-wide wage growth for years.156  The 
only way to protect these disequilibrium wages over the years 
has been through restrictive trade policies.157  It is for this rea-
  
 150. Buchanan, Analysis: Politics of Steel, supra note 30. 
 151. Id.  See Romancing Big Steel, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2002 (Prior to the 
2000 election, “Dick Cheney, as George Bush’s running mate, wooed West 
Virginia’s steel workers, promising that his boss (unlike Bill Clinton) would 
not forget them.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note 144, 
at 119. 
 155. Id.  See also Meltdown, supra note 121 (“Steel is an old business in 
America, dominated by firms such as U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel that 
date back to the 19th century.  That is a proud legacy but also a costly one, 
measured in everything from the size of their pension plans to the cost of 
cleaning up old facilities.”). 
 156. Dornbusch & Frankel, Macroeconomics and Protection, supra note 144, 
at 119. 
 157. Id.  See Meltdown, supra note 121 (“Backed by an army of lawyers, 
American steel makers have been attacking imports for decades, successfully 
winning over one administration after another.  Despite years of decline, steel 
remains one of the most protected and subsidised industries in America, and 
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son that the steel lobby has become so adept at getting its needs 
met in recent times.  As noted above, the steel industry’s politi-
cal machine may have played a large role in deciding the 2000 
Presidential election. 
While an analysis of the U.S. steel industry’s political might, 
and its propensity to call for protection, may lead to the impli-
cation that U.S. steel companies are the only ones clamoring for 
help158 — their complaints coincide with the decline of the 
American industrial worker in general.159  The reasons that 
Americans should remain skeptical of globalized free trade can 
be seen in a pair of economic theories.  The first is a concept 
recognized in the nineteenth century by David Ricardo, known 
as the “law of comparative advantage.”160  The law of compara-
tive advantage postulates that, when free trade is established 
between two countries, each country will take on the manufac-
turing or production duties best suited to it.161  This concept has 
negative implications for production-oriented industries such as 
the steel industry.  It implies that companies, if given the op-
portunity, will relocate production facilities to countries where 
the price of labor is lower.162  While this may not sound the 
death knell for American industrial workers — so long as we 
are able to maintain a technological and efficiency advantage — 
it may have more important negative implications for their bar-
gaining power in future labor disputes.163   
The second economic theory that should give American indus-
trial workers pause when they contemplate the benefits of free 
  
one of the main irritants in global trade negotiations, weakening American 
arguments for open markets elsewhere.”). 
 158. See Fuller, U.S. Agency Rejects New Tariffs on Steel, supra note 122. 
 159. Thurow, New Rules supra note 18, at 249–50. 
 160. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION, 313 (Ronald M. Hartwell ed., 1971) (1819). 
 161. Id.  See also Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 218.  
The theory of comparative advantage is often criticized for depending on a 
relatively perfect competitive environment that rarely exists in the real world.  
See Paul Krugman, Strategic Sectors and International Competition, in U.S. 
TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 207 (Robert M. Stern ed., 
1988). 
 162. See ECONOMIST, supra note 16 (production costs for steel in the U.S. are 
among the highest in the world, second only to Japan). 
 163. Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 225. 
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trade is that of “factor price equalization.”164  At its most basic 
level, the theory of factor price equalization states that real 
wages for labor in the U.S. will continue to fall, while real 
wages in developing countries will continue to rise because 
companies can now relocate their production capacity at will.165  
Therefore, if this theory is correct in its assumptions, because 
the cost of living in the U.S. is bound to be much higher than 
that in developing nations, industrial laborers in America may 
soon become a thing of the past.166  These are sobering concepts.  
America has defined itself by its industrial might for more than 
a century, and, while the turn towards technology seems inevi-
table, there is no doubt that the road ahead will not be smooth 
for America’s industrial workers.  
The final political factor weighing on President Bush’s deci-
sion is the argument that a viable steel industry is an essential 
element of national security.  The concept of protecting indus-
tries in order to preserve national security has existed as long 
as the concept of free trade.167  While economists have consis-
tently argued that industries necessary to the preservation of 
national security should be given direct subsidies, rather than 
supported with restrictions on imports, this has not happened 
in the U.S..168  The national security argument carries an inor-
dinate amount of weight at present, and the steel industry, in 
its latest campaign entitled “Stand Up for Steel,” missed no op-
portunity to point this out when lobbying for the present tariff 
measures.169  To some degree, a viable steel industry is neces-
  
 164. Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 249–50. 
 165. Id.  See also Rick Jervis, As Debate on Tariffs Rages, U.S. Steel Ex-
pands in EU’s Backyard, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A15 (“Steel still is a 
labor-intensive industry and, with the U.S.’s high labor costs, you could see 
[production facilities] slowly moving [from the U.S.] to the east.”).  
 166. Thurow, New Rules, supra note 18, at 249–50. 
 167. See SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 33, at 429–31.  See also 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 60, at 22 (in addition to 
being necessary for national security purposes, a steel industry may also be-
come an attribute of sovereignty — a crown jewel of sorts). 
 168. See PETER KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 171 (1985).   
 169. See Facts About Steel, supra note 32 (“The history of America’s steel 
industry is inseparable from our nation’s economic, political and military de-
velopment.”).  See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (President Bush, 
in August 2001, “told cheering steel workers in Pittsburgh that their product 
was ‘an important national security issue.’”). 
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sary for U.S. national security, but the question remains — how 
far must we go to protect this industry?170   
V. CONCLUSION  
On a macro level, the U.S. has always had difficulties recon-
ciling protectionism and free trade.171  These difficulties stem 
from the fact that unfettered free trade begets a sacrifice of sov-
ereignty that the people of the U.S. do not seem eager to coun-
tenance.172  Simply put, the problem facing proponents of free 
trade in the U.S. is that we live in a democracy.  People will 
only indulge free trade so long as it does not infringe on their 
lifestyle.173  While this decidedly protectionist attitude draws 
the ire of many who believe that free trade is essential both to 
our economy, and to the overall development of the world,174 the 
facts indicate that the people of the U.S. are uncomfortable with 
the idea of wholeheartedly embracing globalized free trade.175   
Overall, President Bush’s steel tariffs do not score well in a 
traditional cost/benefit analysis, where the whole of American 
society is viewed.176  Although the steel industry was once the 
poster-child of America’s economic might, today it plays only a 
small role in our economy.  The reasons for the steel industry’s 
decline in economic might are numerous; and, while many of 
those reasons are the direct result of increased globalization, 
  
 170. See Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (“The uncertainty lies in the 
political calculations.  Some Republicans may be at risk if [President] Bush 
angers the steel lobby. . . .  [President] Bush’s wild approval ratings suggest 
he could dare to jilt Big Steel.  Less obvious is whether he has the will.”).  
 171. See LOVETT ET AL., U.S. TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO, 
supra note 23, at 56.  
 172. See Bernstein, supra note 87. 
 173. See Id. 
 174. Bray, supra note 87, at 13. 
 175. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests, supra note 23 
(“In 1999, only twenty-eight percent [of Americans] believed that the U.S. 
should lower its trade barriers even if other countries do not.”).  See also Bern-
stein, supra note 87. 
 176. See Rust Never Sleeps, supra note 105 (“Once again, America’s steel 
industry has shown its extraordinary political clout.  Against its 160,000 
workers, [President] Bush had to weigh the interests of American consumers, 
foreign producers and, if his shrillest critics were to be believed, the future of 
free trade itself.  And yet, in the end . . . steelworkers . . . had the final say.”).  
See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151 (twelve million people work in 
steel-consuming industries, while only 160,000 produce steel). 
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some of the blame also lies with the former giants, such as 
Bethlehem Steel, and U.S. Steel.177  These former giants still 
hold the ear of many politicians in Washington, and have con-
sistently used their political clout to force protectionist meas-
ures designed to prop up their failing businesses.178  The steel 
industry is the most protected industry in America and will con-
tinue as such until the true costs of imposing tariffs are seen 
through an economic, rather than political lens. 
While President Bush campaigned on a platform of free trade, 
his steel tariffs indicate that America’s trade policy is in des-
perate need of clarification.179  This conclusion has gained valid-
ity in the months after the tariffs were first imposed.  Since an-
nouncing the new tariffs on March 5, 2002, the Bush admini-
stration has retreated from its original tariff structure signifi-
cantly.180  Of the 13 million tons of imported steel originally af-
fected by the tariffs, 25% are now exempt from duties.181  The 
President has acquiesced to pressure from large steel using 
companies such as Daimler-Chrysler, while leaving smaller 
steel users to fend for themselves under the price increases 
caused by the tariffs.182  In sum, only the largest of steel using 
manufacturers have benefited from President Bush’s backtrack-
ing.183 
More recently, the WTO released a 900-page preliminary re-
port indicating that the U.S. steel tariffs are a violation of 
  
 177. Dettmer, supra note 17, at 47 (“The U.S. steel industry has done little 
in the last few years to transform itself from a lame duck to a lean, mean, 
manufacturing machine.”).  See also In America’s Fiery Furnace, supra note 75 
(the fact that American steel has enjoyed governmental protection of some 
sort for the past two decades has allowed its major players to put off much-
needed consolidation). 
 178. See Press Release, American Institute for International Steel, Steel 
Trade Policy, supra note 38 (“As a result of the 40-year effort by the domestic 
steel industry, the U.S. has the most protective and economically irrational 
trade laws in the world.  Following quota protection (1960’s), price controls 
(1970’s), and absolute quotas (1980’s to the early 1990’s), the latest protection-
ist weapon of choice for the U.S. steel industry is the dumping law.”). 
 179. Reif & Ranaswami, Joltin Joe has left and gone away, supra note 80, at 
429--30. 
 180. Neil King Jr. and Geoff Winestock, U.S. Weakens Steel Tariffs Further, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at A2. 
 181. King Jr. & Matthews, supra note 38. 
 182. King Jr. & Winestock, supra note 180, at A2. 
 183. Id. 
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global trade rules.184  This report, although not final, confirms 
this Note’s analysis of the “import surge” relied upon by the 
Bush administration in the instant case.185  President Bush’s 
response to this report also seems to confirm the notion that 
these tariffs are not a product of economic necessity; but, 
rather, they are a political invention designed to curry favor in 
‘Rust Belt’ states.186  Instead of ending the tariffs now that sanc-
tions on other industries are imminent, the Bush administra-
tion plans on appealing the official ruling when it comes out, 
and then negotiating with the WTO on appropriate compensa-
tion.187  In short, President Bush plans on continuing his sub-
sidization of American steel producers, despite increased costs 
to steel consumers and the impending negative consequences to 
other industries. 188  As noted in Section III, this disregard for 
the economic consequences of imposing tariffs is violative of the 
requirement in Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, that any 
action “provide greater economic and social benefits than 
costs.”189  Disregarding the WTO’s ruling will also have interna-
tional political consequences for the U.S., at a time when we 
urgently need international support.  
  
 184. Robert Guy Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2003, at A2 (“A final WTO decision, which is expected to 
follow the preliminary ruling, is due in about a month.  The WTO wouldn’t 
comment on or confirm the panel’s report.”). 
 185. See infra Section III (discussing the facts surrounding the ‘import 
surge’ that was relied upon by the Bush administration). 
 186. See Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. Steel Tariffs Likely to Stay Despite 
WTO-Sanction Threat, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at A2 (“The Bush admini-
stration plans to appeal the official ruling . . . and then start a long process of 
negotiations with the WTO.”).  See also Romancing Big Steel, supra note 151.  
If the E.U. decides to implement retaliatory sanctions, the list of U.S. exports 
affected could include textiles, steel, and orange juice.  CNN/World, EC Com-
piles U.S. Tariff ‘Hit’ List, supra note 27.   
 187. Matthews, U.S. Steel Tariffs Likely to Stay Despite WTO-Sanction 
Threat, supra note 186, at A2. 
 188. See Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules, supra 
note 184, at A2 (“[S]teel users blame the tariffs for sharply higher prices, 
which have increased their own costs, supply shortages and quality issues.  
David Pritchard, chief executive of A.J. Rose Manufacturing . . . testified be-
fore the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, that tariffs added 
$1.1 million to the company’s cost of material in the last year and that he was 
forced to lay off 33 workers in the past year.”). 
 189. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as 
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2487 (1975)) (Section 201). 
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The fact is, we live in a world where it is possible to create a 
product in the U.S., ship it to Malaysia to be packaged, and 
then put it to market in Europe.190  There is no reasonable way 
to turn back from the path of globalized free trade, so the U.S. 
must make a concerted effort to live with the world that our 
trade policies have, in effect, created.191  It has been said that 
the best response to some international events, such as a tem-
porary influx in imports, is one of adjustment in the domestic 
economy rather than protected resistance to change.192  This did 
not happen in the instant case, and has not happened in the 
past forty years with respect to the U.S. steel industry. 
As long as the American steel industry can deliver votes, its 
ability to induce protective measures from the U.S. government 
will remain intact.  The steel tariffs of March 5, 2002, are a per-
fect example of this phenomenon.  While their economic benefits 
to the nation as a whole will certainly be found lacking, the 
benefits to President Bush seem to have already accrued.193  
The international fallout has already begun,194 but the conse-
quences of this fallout, which will be seen in retaliatory tariffs 
imposed on other more viable industries, have not yet occurred.  
When the consequences of President Bush’s imposition of tariffs 
are finally felt, someone is sure to be blamed for making a po-
litical decision where the laws of economics should have ruled 
— the one sure thing is that the blame will not be left at the 
feet of the steel industry. 
 
Brady P. Priest∗ 
  
 190. Sachs, International Economics, supra note 83, at 220. 
 191. See infra Section II, in particular, the U.S.’s post-World War II trade 
policy and the creation of GATT and the WTO. 
 192. Dixit, How Should the United States Respond, supra note 141, at 249. 
 193. See infra Section IV, referring to the President’s unlikely victory in 
West Virginia, a state largely controlled by the Democratic Party. 
 194. See infra Section I for the reaction of the U.S.’s major trading partners.  
See also Matthews, WTO Says U.S. Tariffs on Steel Violate Rules, supra note 
184. 
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